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Abstract
This paper uncovers ‘conspicuous work’ as a new form of status seeking that can explain
social interactions in labour supply. We analyse how peer working time relates to both
labour supply and happiness for Dutch male workers. Using a unique measure of peer
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Individuals’ labour supply decisions appear to be influenced by their peers’ behaviour. Dif-
ferent explanations have been developed for such mimetic behaviour, ranging from externalities
generated by peer behaviour to status seeking on the part of the individual. This paper studies
the role peer working time plays in an agent’s utility function in order to find which motivations
drive mimetic behaviour in labour supply at the intensive margin. To do so, we examine how
peer working time relates to both the working time and happiness of individuals in a sample of
Dutch men.
Several studies have found evidence of peer effects in working time (Woittiez and Kapteyn,
1998; Aronsson et al., 1999; Weinberg et al., 2004; Grodner and Kniesner, 2008). We add to this
literature by using a unique measure of peer labour supply, namely, the average weekly working
time of a man’s acquaintances, as reported by the respondent himself.1
We want to shed light on the drivers of these peer effects in working time. We study the
role of peer working time in an individual’s utility function by examining the relation between
peer working time and individual happiness. This means that we use self-reported happiness as
a proxy for utility. This approach has yielded interesting insights for the study of the potentially
imitative character of obesity (Blanchflower et al., 2009; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2007). We
apply it to the study of working time.
In this paper, we first summarize the hypotheses given in the literature about the ways in
which peer behaviour and peer working time in particular can enter an individual utility function.
We identify three main models. First, peer working time can generate externalities and therefore
influence the marginal utility of leisure or of work for an individual (e.g. see the spillover effects
of Grodner and Kniesner, 2006). Second, an individual can have a preference for conformity and
thus derive utility from working the same number of hours as his peers (see the conformity effects
of Grodner and Kniesner, 2006). Third, the individual can derive status and therefore utility
from the difference between his own working time and that of his peers (see the emulation model
of Clark and Oswald, 1998). If the individual derives status from working less than his peers,
this is a case of ‘conspicuous leisure’. Alternatively, in what we call the ‘conspicuous work’ case,
the individual derives status from working more than his peers, which increases his utility.
1Earlier studies use the working time of workers with characteristics similar to the individual’s (e.g. Aronsson
et al., 1999) or a working time variable constructed on the basis of other peer characteristics described by the
individual (Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1998).
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Using data from the CentER data panel, a panel survey of Dutch households, for the period
1994–2011, we first find a positive relation between a man’s working time and that of his peers,
as found in earlier studies and as predicted by all three models mentioned above. Second, we find
that men are less happy if their peers work more, even when controlling for their own working
time and for their own and peer income. This is consistent with the conspicuous work model, in
which individuals derive status from their working time and in which the optimal behaviour is
to imitate one’s peers because their utility function is concave in status. We use individual fixed
effects to control for unobserved characteristics, including those that individuals might share
with their peers, and additional robustness checks suggest that the relations identified here are
not spurious.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section formulates different models, to be tested
empirically, for the different ways in which peer labour supply can influence an individual’s
utility and his labour supply. It also gives a brief overview of the empirical literature. Section
3 describes the data. Section 4 tests the different models formulated earlier, first, by analysing
the link between peer working time and men’s own working time and, second, by studying how
peer working time relates to men’s happiness. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1 Social Interactions in Labour Supply
1.1 Models of Social Interactions in Labour Supply
Externalities
A first way to explain why individuals are affected by their peers’ working time is to argue
that peer working time generates externalities. Working alone or relaxing alone is arguably less
enjoyable than working or relaxing with others. Alesina et al. (2006) present a simple model
accounting for what they call a social multiplier effect in leisure and use it to explain differences
in hours worked between the United States and Europe. Vendrik (1998) develops a model
that explains long-run changes in labour supply by bandwagon effects, that is, by the fact that
individual preferences are influenced by average behaviour in their social group. Grodner and
Kniesner (2006) model a similar idea under the name spillover effects. Similarly, Stiglitz (2008)
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argues that the marginal utility of leisure decreases when others work more because it is more
enjoyable to spend leisure time together. There is indeed evidence that individuals coordinate
their working hours to have common leisure time within the household (Hamermesh, 2002) and
within regions (Jenkins and Osberg, 2004).
The individual’s utility function, in such a case, takes the form2
U = U(h, hh¯,c,X) (1)
where h stands for the weekly working time of the individual, h¯ is the weekly working time of
the relevant peer group, c is the consumption of market goods and services, and X is a vector of
personal characteristics and tastes. Here Uhh¯ > 0, meaning that the individual enjoys working
more the more his peers work.
In all the models presented in this section, the labour supply function takes the form
H = H(w, y, h¯,X) (2)
where w represents the hourly wage rate an individual can command on the labour market
and y is his non-labour income. In the externalities model, Hh¯ > 0, because an increase in peer
hours leads to an increase in the marginal utility from work (and conversely to a decrease in the
marginal utility from leisure) for the individual.3
Conformity
Second, peer working time can set a norm to which individuals want to conform. Akerlof’s
(1980) theory of social custom and the identity theory of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) state that
an individual’s utility will be enhanced through an increase in identity utility if he behaves as
people from his social category are expected. In the case of working time, this means that an
individual will dislike having working hours that deviate greatly from what is expected of people
in his social category. His peers’ working hours can be considered a reasonable proxy for what
2This is a specific form of an interaction model. We choose to test this form because it is common in the
literature (Vendrik 1998; Grodner and Kniesner 2006).
3To allow for this interpretation, we need to abstract from the issue of the timing of work by assuming that
everyone works roughly during the same hours.
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is expected. Vendrik (2003) develops a specific version of the theory of social custom for labour
supply. Clark (2003) shows that unemployed men are happier if their peers are unemployed as
well and interpret this as evidence that unemployment can constitute a social norm. Grodner and
Kniesner (2006) call such normative effects of the average labour supply in a group conformity
effects. Analogous to their model, we can model the individual utility function in this case as
U = U((h− h¯)2, h, c,X) (3)
where U(h−h¯)2 < 0, since there is a reputation cost of deviating from the social norm. This
specification ensures that there is no reputation effect if the individual complies to the norm and
a negative one if he deviates from it (see Clark 2003).
In the labour supply function, again, Hh¯ > 0, because the longer a man’s peers work, the
more he is willing to work himself, since he wants to conform to the social norm of working long
hours.4 Bernheim (1994) develops a model in which individuals who care about status derived
from complying with the social norm tend to conform to a homogeneous standard of behaviour,
even if their preferences regarding that behaviour differ. Social norms held by individuals or by
the people around them have been shown to influence the division of household and market work
in couples (Van der Lippe and Siegers, 1994). Stutzer and Lalive (2004) show that individuals in
communities with a stronger social norm to work tend to have shorter unemployment durations.
Burda et al. (2013) find that theories based on social norms are consistent with the distribution
of work across genders in a number of countries.
Status: Conspicuous leisure or conspicuous work?
A third way to explain social interactions in labour supply is to start from the idea that individ-
uals derive status from the difference between their own labour supply and that of others. Clark
and Oswald (1998) develop a general model of the behavioural implications of striving for status
through differentiation. Applying their model to the case in which status can be derived from
labour supply behaviour, one obtains an individual utility function of the form
4Grodner and Kniesner (2006) show how conformity effects and spillover effects have different implications for
peer effects on labour supply: While the former lead to labour supply tending towards the mean of the reference
group, the latter lead to a snowball increase in labour supply.
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U = U(s, h, c,X) (4)
where s is a status term, which in our case can take the form s = h − h¯ – in the case
of what Clark and Oswald (1998) call additive comparisons – or s = h/h¯ – in the case of
ratio comparisons. How exactly this status term affects individual utility depends on whether
individuals derive status from having more leisure than their peers or from working more.
Veblen (1899) coined the concept of conspicuous leisure, that is, the idea that individuals can
prove their status not only by consuming expensive and exclusive goods (conspicuous consump-
tion), but also by showing that they do not have to work much and can afford to learn all kinds
of skills that are not directly productive. Frijters and Leigh (2008) depict individuals in present
times as making trade-offs between investing in conspicuous consumption and in conspicuous
leisure and show that the balance is shifting towards the first element as mobility increases and
leisure activities are less easily registered by one’s environment. In the presence of conspicuous
leisure, we have Us < 0 and therefore also Uh¯ > 0.
However, individuals nowadays also signal their status to others through working time itself.
In many social groups, an individual can indeed increase his status by telling everyone that he
is very busy, preferably even more than others around him. Symmetrically, he can lose status if
he has less to do than others. We label the case in which working time is viewed as a provider
of status conspicuous work. Clark and Oswald (1998, p. 144) cite emulation in labour supply
as a possible application of their model: ‘One example is the Japanese-style case of corporate
cultures in which everyone works at high levels of effort. When performance gives status, either
directly or through added earnings, the model predicts effort-following’. Experimental results
by Falk and Ichino (2006) also seem in line with the idea of conspicuous work: They find that
individuals are more productive in their job if they share a room with another worker than if
they work alone. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the workers derive status from their
relative productivity. This suggests that there is, by analogy, a possibility for individuals to
derive status from their working time. Their results are also in line with an individual utility
function that is concave in status: They find that sharing a room with another worker seems
to increase productivity more for workers who are less productive. One can imagine that the
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increase in productivity is larger because the increase in status is also larger for those who lag
further behind their peers in terms of productivity and therefore status. In the conspicuous work
model, we have Us > 0 and therefore Uh¯ < 0.
Clark and Oswald (1998) show that if individual utility functions are concave in social com-
parisons, those seeking status will tend to conform to the behaviour of others. This has the
interesting implication that both conspicuous leisure and conspicuous work will lead to following
behaviour in labour supply. In terms of the labour supply function presented above, we have
Hh¯ > 0 in the conspicuous leisure case, because if an individual’s peers reduce their working
time, the individual would need to reduce his as well to maintain his relative leisure position.
Conversely, if his peers increase their working time, he can afford to increase his without losing
status from conspicuous leisure while increasing the utility he derives from consumption through
increased income from work.
In the case of conspicuous work, we also have Hh¯ > 0: If an individual’s peers increase their
working time, the individual will imitate them to maintain the status he derives from conspicuous
work. The labour supply of his peers motivates a man to work more hours to improve his relative
working time position. The working time of his peers influences his behaviour because of his
preference for the status of a ‘hard worker’.
To sum up, all three models of social interactions in labour supply predict a positive effect of
peer working time on individual working time, but for different reasons, associated with different
roles of peer working time in the individual utility function.
1.2 Peer Effects in Working Time: Empirical Evidence and Link with
Happiness
Empirical evidence of peer effects in working time
There is evidence that individuals conform to the labour supply of those around them. Peer
labour supply has been found to have an influence on mothers’ labour market participation (Mau-
rin and Moschion, 2009), exit rates from welfare programmes (Van der Klaauw and Van Ours,
2003), exit from unemployment (Topa, 2001), and effort provision of workers (Ichino and Maggi,
2000; Falk and Ichino, 2006). As far as the number of hours worked is concerned, various studies
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find evidence of peer effects. Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) find that, for married women in the
Netherlands, the desired number of hours worked is influenced by the working time of a peer
group constructed on the basis of the characteristics of the women themselves and the charac-
teristics of their peers as reported by these women. Aronsson et al. (1999) find that the number
of hours worked by Swedish married men is influenced by the number of hours worked in a social
reference group defined on the basis of age, educational level, and the presence of children in
the household. Weinberg et al. (2004) find that the male employment rate in the neighbourhood
influences the annual number of hours worked by young American men. Grodner and Kniesner
(2008) construct a peer group based on a measure of economic proximity and find that this peer
group’s working time is positively related to the working time of married American men.
The estimation of peer effects raises, however, a number of methodological problems. First,
most studies examining the effect of peer behaviour on labour supply have to make strong
assumptions about the peer group. The studies about peer effects in working time mentioned
above mainly construct peer groups based on demographic and/or geographic criteria. The only
exception is the study of Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998), who construct their measure of peer
working time using information provided by the respondents about whom they consider to be
their peer group. Soetevent (2006, p. 222) regrets that this strategy ‘was since then not copied
by other researchers’. To our knowledge, subjective data about peer groups has still not been
used in more recent years to estimate peer effects on labour supply.
A second problem is that one has to find a strategy to distinguish effects really caused by
peer behaviour from what Manski (1993) calls correlated effects, that is, effects that are simply
due to the fact that individuals and their peers share unobserved characteristics or that they
are affected by the same environmental factors or shocks. Aronsson et al. (1999) use cohort
fixed effects to account for changes in the preferences of the reference group as a whole, which
enables them to control for time-invariant shared unobservables, but not for common shocks or
shared unobservables that would vary over time. Grodner and Kniesner (2008) instrument the
mean labour supply of a reference group using the mean labour supply in the adjacent reference
group. For this technique to solve the problems mentioned, they have to assume that the labour
supply in this adjacent reference group is not correlated with an individual’s own labour supply,
that is, no unobservables or common shocks are shared with this adjacent group and the mean
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labour supply of this adjacent group has no direct influence on men’s own labour supply. Finally,
Weinberg et al. (2004) use individual fixed effects and individual-specific experience profiles to
correct for the influence of shared unobservables, both time invariant and time varying, but they
cannot entirely rule out the effect of common shocks.
From the literature, we can conclude that there is evidence that a man’s working time is
influenced by the labour supply of his environment, even if not all methodological problems
have been resolved yet. Understanding the potential mechanisms behind such peer effects could
help us to better understand whether and how peer working time actually influences individual
working time.
Peer working time and happiness
Peer influences, or social influences in general, are often mentioned in the literature as one of
the possible drivers behind the link between working time and subjective well-being: ‘Social
custom and conditioning might affect subjective well-being and the gender division of labour’
(Booth and Van Ours, 2008, p.F79)); ‘Men might be more satisfied with longer working hours
because the social norm is to work full-time’ (Rätzel, 2009, p.21). Booth and Van Ours (2009)
explain their finding that working full-time is positively associated with the life satisfaction of
men and negatively associated with that of women due to the fact that couples behave according
to traditional gender identities. However, to our knowledge, the way in which peer working time
influences individual well-being has not yet been examined.
In this paper, we examine the link between peer working time and happiness to obtain a
better picture of an individual’s utility function. We are aware of the fact that self-reported
happiness is only an imperfect proxy for utility, since individuals make mistakes in predicting
their happiness when they make decisions (Kahneman and Thaler, 2006) and sometimes even
seem to consciously choose something else than maximizing their happiness (Benjamin et al.,
2012). Still, we believe that self-reported happiness and utility are sufficiently correlated for
an analysis of happiness to yield interesting insights into characteristics of the utility function.
Happiness data are used to study potential imitative behaviour by Oswald and Powdthavee
(2007) and Blanchflower et al. (2009), who apply the model of Clark and Oswald (1998) to the
case of obesity. They show that relative weight influences individual happiness and that this
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could lead to imitative obesity. We build on these contributions and test the model of Clark and
Oswald (1998) along with two concurrent models in the case of relative labour supply.
2 Data
We use the CentER data panel, a panel survey held since 1993 among Dutch households. The
estimation sample consists of men aged 23 to 60 (as in Booth and Van Ours, 2013) surveyed in the
years 1994 to 2011. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables in our estimation
sample. We choose to focus on individuals with a positive weekly working time, unlike Booth &
Van Ours (2008, 2009, 2013), because we want to determine the effects of weekly working time
and would like to avoid picking up any effect of being employed rather than unemployed. To rule
out any effect on happiness of being employed while one’s peers are unemployed, we also exclude
individuals who report zero as the average working time of their peers and those who indicate
that most of their peers do not have a paid job.5
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Happiness 4.03 0.63 1 5
Log net household income 10.23 0.60 6.12 11.62
Log net peer household income (11-point scale) 1.99 0.23 0 2.40
Weekly hours 41.65 9.14 1 72
Peer weekly hours 39.63 5.49 1 70
Looking for another job 0.20 0.40 0 1
Subjective health 4.06 0.64 1 5
Age 43.96 9.08 23 60
Number of children 1.11 1.19 0 6
Partner 0.83 0.38 0 1
The number of hours that respondents work is measured by a number of questions with
respect to their normal (contractual) weekly working hours, their usual working hours, and any
additional hours they work in a second job. To measure weekly working time, we add up the
usual number of hours and hours worked in second jobs. The happiness of respondents was
measured by their response to the question: ‘All in all, to what extent do you consider yourself
a happy person?’, to which they could answer using a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very happy’ to
5In the robustness checks in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we show that including non-working individuals and those
with non-working peers does not substantially change the results.
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‘very unhappy’.6 Figure A1 presents histograms of the distributions of the happiness and hours
variables that are central to the analysis.
The questions about an individual’s peers were introduced as follows: ‘The following questions
concern your circle of acquaintances, that is, the people with whom you associate frequently, such
as friends, neighbours, acquaintances, or maybe people at work’. The labour supply of the people
in the respondents’ environment was measured using two separate questions for men and women,
formulated as follows: ‘If you think of the men among your acquaintances, how many hours per
week do they work on average?’. Figure A2 shows how peer working time relates to an individual’s
own working time. The answers about peer working time are concentrated along horizontal lines,
which seems to indicate that the respondents used the focal points constituted by a number of
standard weekly work durations (e.g. 30, 36, 38, 40, 45, 50, and 60 hours). If individuals would
use their own working time as a proxy for their peers’ working time, most observations would be
concentrated on the 45-degree line. We see that this is not the case, which is reassuring, because
it means that reporting bias is unlikely to play a big role in our analysis.
The questionnaire also contained a number of questions about the age of most of the re-
spondent’s acquaintances (in five-year age groups), the number of persons in most of these
acquaintances’ household, the average total net income per year of those households (in 11 cate-
gories), the level of education of most of the acquaintances (in seven categories), and the kind of
employment of most of the acquaintances. Table C1 and Table C2 compare the characteristics of
men in our sample to those of their peers. The figures show that men in our sample are generally
similar to their peers but that, as one could expect, not everyone classifies the majority of their
peers as similar to themselves in terms of age, education level, household size, and so forth. This
demonstrates that directly collecting information on peer characteristics has real added value.
We lose about a quarter of the observations on working men aged 23 to 60 due to non-response
on the peer labour supply and happiness questions. Using the test designed byWooldridge (1995),
we find that this does not lead to selection bias in our estimates (results available from the au-
thors). The response to the question about the average income of the respondent’s acquaintances
is lower (only about 50%) than for other items relating to peers. To avoid losing too many obser-
6Those who answered that they ‘don’t know’ were excluded from the sample. They represent less than 1% of
the sample.
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vations, we predicted the missing values for peer income as the linear prediction resulting from
estimation of an ordered logit model with measured peer income as the dependent variable and
measured peer characteristics as the independent variables (see Appendix B for more information
about the prediction of peer income and about the cleaning of the data).
3 Estimations
3.1 Peer Working Time and Individuals’ Own Working Time
All three models of social interactions in labour supply discussed above predict that the relation
between individuals’ own and peer working time should be positive. Therefore, we start by
estimating this relation.
Estimation method
We estimate a fixed effects model. This is useful not only to control for unobserved heterogeneity
among individuals but also, more importantly, to take into account unobserved characteristics
that individuals can share with their peers and which can account for part of a positive relation
between their own and peer working time. The standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
We do not observe hourly wages directly. Computing the hourly wage on the basis of total
earnings and hours worked would cause a bias in its coefficients, since hours worked is the
dependent variable in our analysis. Therefore, we follow Weinberg et al. (2004) by estimating a
reduced form of the labour supply equation that does not include hourly wage.7
Estimation results
Table 2 presents the estimation results.
We first estimate a baseline model that does not include peer working time (column 1). Peer
working time is added to this baseline model in column 2. The coefficient on the working time
of male peers is positive and significant. The working time of female peers, when included in the
7Including hourly wage and non-earned income as regressors in the model does not cause the coefficient on
peer working time to change.
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Table 2: Weekly Hours Worked: OLS Model with Fixed-Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.0999*** 0.0939***
(0.0285) (0.0288)
Log net peer household income 0.5682
(0.5811)
Age 0.8885*** 0.8695*** 0.8529***
(0.2721) (0.2696) (0.2703)
Age^2 -0.0113*** -0.0110*** -0.0109***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Number of children -0.1005 -0.0977 -0.0999
(0.2670) (0.2592) (0.2601)
Partner 0.4684 0.4310 0.3965
(0.7843) (0.7826) (0.7815)
Constant 25.0427*** 21.1676*** 20.8889***
(6.1088) (6.3047) (6.3241)
Observations 8203 8203 8203
Individuals 3042 3042 3042
R2 0.02 0.03 0.03
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in parentheses; * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Year dummies included as additional controls.
model, is not significant (results available from the authors). In addition, including the hours
worked by the individual’s partner does not affect the coefficient on peer working time (results
available from the authors). The coefficient on peer working time remains positive and even
hardly changes when peer income is added to the model as a regressor (column 3).8
Our results are in line with evidence of peer effects on working time found in earlier studies.
In their estimation of peer effects on labour supply, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) and Grodner
and Kniesner (2008) include a lag of individuals’ own working time to control for habit formation
in the labour supply. Following their example (see column 1 of Table C3), we find that habit
formation indeed plays a role, but that the coefficient on peer working time remains virtually
unchanged.9
8The coefficient on peer income, however, is larger when peer hours are not included in the model.
9We are aware that including a lag of the dependent variable as a regressor in a fixed effects model leads to
bias (Nickell 1981). In a pooled model, the coefficient on peer working time drops by half when lagged individual’s
own hours are included, but both variables remain significant at the 1% level.
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The positive coefficient on peer working time, which remains smaller than one, suggests that
individuals tend to follow the labour supply of their peers, without engaging in an explosive rat
race.
Robustness checks
We estimate a number of additional models to check for the role of various potential sources of
bias in our estimation results. Table 3 presents an overview of the results of various robustness
checks we conducted. The fixed effects baseline model reproduced in row 0 of the table is the
point of reference.
Table 3: Overview of Robustness Checks for the Weekly Hours Estimations
Potential source of bias Estimation method Coefficient on
peer working
time
0 Fixed-effects model (baseline) 0.0939***
1 Reverse causality
(Endogenous effects)
Use lag of peer working time 0.0611**
2 Influence of other peer
characteristics
(Exogenous effects)
Control for other observed peer
characteristics
0.0857***
3 Time-invariant
unobservables (Correlated
effects 1)
Pooled model for comparison
with fixed-effects model
0.4158***
4 Common shocks (e.g. in
labour demand)
(Correlated effects 2)
Desired working time as
dependent variable
0.0677*
5 Endogenous controls Drop potentially endogenous
controls
0.1001***
1. First, we want to examine the role of possible feedback effects from the individual’s
own working time to peer working time (endogenous effects in Manski’s (1993) terminology).
Therefore, we also estimate the model replacing the present value of peer working time by its
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one-year lagged value. The estimation results are presented in column 2 of Table C3. The
coefficient on the lag of peer working time is still positive and significant.10
2. Second, to account for what Manski calls exogenous effects, we check whether observable
characteristics of peers other than their working time have an influence on an individual’s working
time. We include the peer characteristics that are measured in our dataset as additional regressors
in the model. The estimation results are presented in column 3 of Table C3. We find that most
added peer characteristics have no significant influence on an individual’s working time.Most
importantly, controlling for additional peer characteristics does not affect the coefficient on peer
working time much.
3. Third, we argued above that estimating a fixed effects model eliminates the role of time-
invariant characteristics that individuals might share with their peers and which might influence
both their peers’ and their own working time. To check this argument, we compare our estimates
with those of a pooled model in Table C4. This table shows that the coefficient on peer working
time is indeed four times larger in pooled estimations, which confirms that using fixed effects
corrects for the role of confounding factors.
4. Then, a man’s working time and that of his peers can both be determined by external
factors, such as labour demand. We therefore estimate a model in which the dependent variable
is no longer actual hours worked but, instead, the man’s desired working time11 (Table C5),
because the desired working time is less likely to be influenced by labour demand conditions
than the actual working time. The estimation results show that peer working time still has a
positive influence on desired working time. This suggests that the positive relation is not purely
driven by demand factors.
5. Next, for the reader worried about the potential endogeneity of control variables such as
peer income, having a partner, or the number of children, we also re-estimated our model leaving
out these control variables. The main results were not affected (see Table 3; full results available
from the authors).
10Individuals can change peers over time. We assume that the peer group does not change much from one year
to another and, also, that the working time of peers does not change much. Further lags of peer working time
were not significant.
11The question about desired hours is phrased as follows: ‘How many hours per week WOULD YOU LIKE to
work in total? If you have more than one job, give the sum total for all jobs’.
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Finally, the reader might be worried about selection bias, because we estimate a labour
supply model using only working individuals with working peers. However, when we remove the
restriction of the positive individual’s own and peer working time on our sample, the sample size
increases only to n = 9261, with 3346 individuals. This means that about 90% of individuals
in our sample work and have peers who work. The chances of selection bias are therefore very
limited.
To sum up, we have addressed the role of time-invariant characteristics shared with peers,
labour demand conditions, reverse causality (feedback effects), and selection bias. 12 All in all,
we consider the results of these robustness checks to be evidence that peer working time has
a positive influence on a man’s own working time. This is consistent with any of the models
presented above in which peer working time enters the agent’s utility function. In the following
section, we want to discriminate between these concurrent models by turning to the link between
peer working time and happiness.
3.2 Peer Working Time and Happiness
Estimation method
In this section, we examine the relation between peer working time and the happiness of male
workers. Earlier research has demonstrated that in studies of self-reported happiness, it is crucial
to take individual fixed effects into account (e.g. Lykken and Tellegen, 1996). Moreover, individ-
ual fixed effects offer a partial solution to the problem of potential endogeneity of an individual’s
own and peer working time. If individuals share some time-invariant characteristics with their
peers that influence both working time and happiness, not controlling for them could lead to
bias in the coefficient of peer working time.
For simplicity, we estimate a linear model with fixed effects. Because our dependent variable
is discrete, we also estimate ordered logits with individual fixed effects for comparison purposes.
Using both the method of Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) (FCF) and the ‘blow-up and
12To try and tackle any potential remaining issues, we also estimated a model in which we instrumented for peer
working time using peer age as an instrument. The effect of peer working time became so imprecisely estimated
that it could not be statistically distinguished from zero. Consequently, the Hausman test did not reject the null
hypothesis of exogeneity of peer working time. Overall, the evidence yielded by instrumenting peer working time
was inconclusive.
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cluster’ (BUC) method of Baetschmann et al. (2011),13 we find, as Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters
(2004), that the estimation results are not substantially different when using ordered logits with
fixed effects (see Table C6).
Estimation results
Table 4 presents the estimation results.
First, in column 1, we estimate a model without peer working time, concentrating on men’s
own hours and net household income. To allow for possible non-linear effects of hours on happi-
ness, the estimation includes a quadratic term for weekly hours.
In columns 2 to 5, we test the three models of social interactions presented in Section 2 by
examining how peer working time relates to individual happiness. Column 2 presents a test of
the externalities hypothesis by including the interaction of a man’s own working time with peer
working time. If individuals enjoy working more when their peers work more hours, we expect
a positive sign on the coefficient of the interaction term. This is not the case here, which seems
to invalidate the externalities hypothesis.14
To test the conformity model, we include the square of the difference between a man’s working
time and the weekly hours of his peers (column 3). The coefficient of this variable is positive
and significant, which is at odds with the idea that men conform to their peers’ working time
because of social norms or externalities in work or leisure.
In columns 4 and 5, we test the status model in its additive comparison and its ratio com-
parison versions, respectively. The sign on the status term enables us to determine whether
individuals derive utility from conspicuous leisure or from conspicuous work. In column 4, we
introduce male peer working time into the regression. Note that this is practically equivalent to
introducing the difference between an individual’s own and peer working time, since we already
control for his own working time. Conspicuous leisure would imply a positive coefficient on peer
working time, while the conspicuous work model would predict the opposite. Peer working time
appears to be negatively associated with happiness, therefore supporting the latter model. This
conspicuous work effect holds even if peer income is included in the model, so it does not only
13We are thankful to Andy Dickerson for providing us with his code (Hole et al., 2011).
14The interaction term is not significant either in a model including only a linear hours term.
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Table 4: Happiness: OLS Model with Fixed-Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weekly hours 0.0093** 0.0174** 0.0197*** 0.0096** 0.0090**
(0.0042) (0.0088) (0.0063) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Weekly hours^2 -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Own hours * peer hours -0.0002
(0.0002)
(Own hours - peer hours)^2 0.0002**
(0.0001)
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.0059 -0.0041**
(0.0092) (0.0020)
Hours ratio 0.0145***
(0.0046)
Log net household income 0.0251* 0.0256* 0.0255* 0.0263* 0.0246*
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0148)
Log net peer household income -0.0387 -0.0332 -0.0438 0.0041
(0.0440) (0.0447) (0.0442) (0.0527)
Looking for another job -0.0524*** -0.0535*** -0.0531*** -0.0527*** -0.0526***
(0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0198)
Subjective health 0.0818*** 0.0825*** 0.0818*** 0.0824*** 0.0821***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Age -0.0349* -0.0338* -0.0344* -0.0332 -0.0353*
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204)
Age^2 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Number of children -0.0039 -0.0026 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0040
(0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0205)
Partner 0.3154*** 0.3194*** 0.3191*** 0.3194*** 0.3158***
(0.0862) (0.0863) (0.0863) (0.0863) (0.0863)
Constant 3.6546*** 3.4848*** 3.4890*** 3.8357*** 3.6643***
(0.4976) (0.6324) (0.5151) (0.5099) (0.5029)
Observations 8,203 8,203 8,203 8,203 8,203
Individuals 3,042 3,042 3,042 3,042 3,042
R2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Year dum-
mies included as additional controls.
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capture a relative income effect.15 In column 5, we include the ratio of one’s own weekly hours
to peer weekly hours, to test the ratio comparison version of the model. We find a positive and
significant relation between the hours ratio and happiness, again supporting the conspicuous
work model.
Interestingly, only the working time of male peers is significantly associated with men’s hap-
piness. The working time of female peers is not significant when taken up in the regression
(results available from the authors).
Since we have only a rather imprecise measure of peer income, we are not able to make hard
conclusions about the relative influence of peer working time and peer income on happiness.
A worker’s own working time and peer working time could influence well-being because they
are predictors of good career perspectives and therefore of lifetime income or because they are
associated with consumption on the job (in the form of additional material benefits, e.g. a
company car).
Clark and Oswald (1998) show that if utility is sufficiently concave in status, individuals will
tend to follow the behaviour of their peers. The positive relation found between a man’s own
working time and the number of hours worked by his peers suggests that this should be the case
here. To verify this, we estimate models in which status, as measured by the difference between
a man’s own hours and his peer’s hours, is included non-linearly in the happiness regression
(see Table C7). First, when taking up a quadratic status term (column 1), it seems individuals’
utility is convex in status, since the sign of the quadratic term is positive. However, this positive
sign seems to be driven by a limited number of extreme values in the difference between an
individual’s own hours and peer hours.16 Therefore, we also estimate the model while dropping
individuals who said they worked more than twice as much as their peers, which corresponds to
dropping 54 observations (column 2). In this case, the difference terms are no longer significant,
but the sign of the quadratic difference in hours is negative. This latter result is in line with
15In fact, the coefficient on peer working time does not change much upon inclusion of peer income, while the
coefficient for peer income loses its significance when peer working time is included. The correlation coefficient
between peer working time and peer income is 0.24.
16Including a cubic term of the status variable in the model or running a local polynomial regression of
happiness on status shows that the utility function is concave over the range of hours differences in which most
observations are concentrated, but convex for especially high values of these differences in hours (results available
from the authors).
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the hypothesis of comparison-concave utility. Similar results are obtained when using the hours
ratio rather than the difference in hours as a measure of status.17
More robust evidence in favour of comparison-concave utility is provided in column 3. Here,
we create dummies for working fewer hours than peers, the same number of hours, or more hours.
We classify an individual as working the same number of hours as his peers if the absolute value
of the difference between his peers’ working time and his own is two hours or less. The results
indicate that working less than one’s peers is negatively related to a man’s happiness, while
working more is not significantly related to happiness. In this model, the hours terms and
status dummies are jointly significant at the 5% level (p<0.025). These results are robust to the
exclusion of individuals who work more than twice as much as their peers (column 4). Altogether,
this evidence explains why we find evidence of peer effects in our labour supply regressions, but
only of very small magnitude.
Robustness checks
We conduct a number of robustness checks to rule out factors that may cause a spurious relation
between peer working time and happiness and to eliminate other potential sources of bias. All
robustness checks are carried out on the model for additive comparisons (column 4 in Table 4)
because this is the simpler formulation of the conspicuous work model. Table 5 presents an
overview of the robustness checks we conducted. For reference, the coefficient obtained in our
baseline model is reproduced in row 0 of the table.
1. First, as in the case of labour supply, we want to control for the influence of peer char-
acteristics other than working time and income. We therefore estimate a model controlling for
the peer characteristics that are measured in our dataset. The estimation results are presented
in Table C8. The coefficients on the additional controls are not significant and the coefficient
17A quadratic of the ratio of an individual’s own hours to peer hours also has a positive and significant
coefficient in the unrestricted estimation sample. In the restricted sample, it has a negative sign but is statistically
insignificant. According to Clark and Oswald (1998), in a ratio comparisons model, there is following behaviour if
−u′′(h/h¯)(h/h¯)−u′(h/h¯) > 0, where u is the contribution of status to utility. In the ratio comparisons model we
estimated on the restricted sample, u = 0.26∗(h/h¯)−0.09∗(h/h¯)2, so that the values of the estimated coefficients
support following behaviour for a ratio of individuals’ own hours to peer hours above 0.72. Alternatively, if we
estimate the model using the log of the hours ratio and a quadratic of this log, we also find a positive sign for
the log and a negative sign for the quadratic, both statistically insignificant, if we restrict the estimation sample
to those individuals with a ratio of their own hours to peer hours between 0.72 and 2. They represent 95% of the
original sample. All results are available from the authors.
20
Table 5: Overview of Robustness Checks for the Happiness Estimations
Potential source of bias Estimation method Coefficient on
peer working
time
0 Fixed-effects model (baseline) -0.0041**
1 Influence of other peer
characteristics
(Exogenous effects)
Control for other observed peer
characteristics
-0.0041**
2 Time-invariant
unobservables (Correlated
effects 1)
Pooled model for comparison
with fixed-effects model
0.0006
3 Endogenous controls Drop potentially endogenous
controls
-0.0043**
4 Job change as potential
confounding factor
Control for tenure -0.0041**
5 Selection bias Include non-working individuals
and those with non-working
peers for comparison purposes
-0.0021*
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on peer working time does not change, which indicates that exogenous effects do not bias our
estimation results.
2. Second, we argued above that the use of individual fixed effects eliminates potential
time-invariant confounding factors. To check this argument, we also estimate a pooled version
of our model (see Table C9). Peer working time turns out to be insignificant in the pooled
model (column 2). This hints towards the presence of unobserved characteristics shared with
peers that have a positive influence on both peer working time and individual happiness. If
this is the case, the peer hours variable in the pooled model captures both the positive effect
of these characteristics on happiness and the negative effect of peer hours due to conspicuous
work, resulting in an insignificant coefficient. Indeed, in column 1 of Table C9, the effect of a
man’s own working time seems to be overestimated in the pooled model, since the quadratic
hours term is insignificant and since taking the coefficients from the pooled model at face value
suggests an optimal working time of 85 hours a week. This suggests the presence of unobserved
characteristics that increase both the number of hours and happiness. In our main model, we
correct for those characteristics by introducing individual fixed effects so that only the negative
effect of peer working time on happiness due to conspicuous work is left to be captured by the
model.
3. One might further be worried that other variables in the models estimated are endoge-
nous (income, peer income, job satisfaction, health, partner, number of children) and that this
endogeneity biases the coefficients on our variables of interest. However, when the model is es-
timated without these potentially endogenous control variables, the estimated coefficients on an
individuals’ own working time and peer working time remain similar (full results available from
the authors).
4. Another potential source of concern is the idea that a job change could affect one’s own
working time, peer working time, and happiness at the same time, therefore driving a spurious
relation between these variables. We do not directly observe job changes in our data, but we can
construct a measure of job tenure. Including this measure as a control in our model or a dummy
for recent job changers (with job tenure shorter than a year or shorter than two years) does not
affect the coefficient on one’s own working time and peer working time (full results available from
the authors).
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5. For the reader worried that focusing on only working men with working peers might
somehow distort the results, we also estimated our main models while including non-working
men and men with non-working peers. The results remain qualitatively the same (full results
available from the authors).18
In conclusion, the negative coefficient on peer working time that we found in our main model
holds when we use different methods aiming at excluding different sources of spuriousness or
bias.19 We conclude that the conspicuous work model is not invalidated. It has to be stressed,
however, that both an individual’s own working time and peer working time are measured by
the respondents’ answers to survey questions. Strictly speaking, we can therefore only say that
men are happier if they have the feeling that they work more or that they do not work less than
their male peers.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have correlated a unique measure of peer working time with both individual
working time and individual happiness, to better understand how peer working time enters an
individual’s utility function. This enabled us to shed light on the drivers of social interactions in
labour supply. We used the Dutch CentER panel and focused on men of working age. We used
the respondents’ answer to the question: ‘If you think of the men among your acquaintances, how
many hours per week do they work on average?’. A first descriptive look at the data confirms that
the use of this unique measure of peer working time has added value compared with constructs
based on individual characteristics, because individuals often report peer characteristics that
differ from their own.
We presented three different models of the role peer working time can play in an individual’s
utility function. In the first model, individuals imitate their peers’ labour supply because peer
18In addition, peer income has a negative and significant coefficient, which might be due to increased power
since we gain about a thousand observations.
19A further potential source of endogeneity could be reverse causality. It would play a role if happier people
are likely to choose different working hours and peer working hours. We attempted to tackle this problem by
using instrumental variables for individuals’ own and peer working hours. As instruments for one’s own working
time, we used the constraints on the respondents’ labour supply, measured as the difference between the desired
weekly working time reported by the respondents and their actual weekly working time. The instrument we used
for peer working time was peer age, but the F-statistic for the first stage indicated that it was not a very strong
instrument. Peer working time, when instrumented, remained negative and significant. The endogeneity test
could not reject the exogeneity of the working time variables.
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working time generates externalities for them that directly affect the marginal utility they ob-
tain from work or leisure. In the second model, people derive utility from conforming to their
peers’ labour supply behaviour because the latter constitutes a social norm. In the third model,
individuals derive status from the difference between their peers’ working time and their own.
This third model can take two forms: In the conspicuous leisure model, individuals derive status
from working less than others because this is interpreted as evidence of aﬄuence. On the other
hand, in the conspicuous work model, status is derived from working a great deal and therefore
individuals derive utility from working more or not working less than their peers. All three
models predict a positive effect of peer labour supply on one’s own labour supply, but they differ
with respect to their predictions about the effect of peer working time on happiness.
In line with all three models, we found evidence of peer effects on men’s working time, in
the sense that a man works more hours the longer his male peers work. This evidence is in
line with the earlier results of Aronsson et al. (1999), Weinberg et al. (2004), and Grodner and
Kniesner (2008). To distinguish between the three models, we studied the link between peer
labour supply and happiness. We found that peer labour supply is negatively related to men’s
happiness, controlling for one’s own working time, one’s own income, and peer income. This
finding is consistent with the conspicuous work model. The evidence suggests that the relations
we find are robust to a number of potential sources of bias or spuriousness.
Our results are in line with a conspicuous work model with comparison-concave utility (i.e.
decreasing marginal utility of status), convex costs of working time, and non-increasing marginal
private utility of working time (Clark and Oswald, 1998). A preference for status derived from
work induces men to follow their peers’ labour supply but, because of the decreasing marginal
utility of status and the increasing marginal net costs of working more, they do not engage in
an explosive rat race. It is worth noting that our results do not necessarily imply an increasing
trend in working time at the macro level. The fact that individuals tend to follow their peers
can also explain a downward trend in weekly working time.20 In the conspicuous work model, a
decrease in peer working time (e.g. due to an external shock) allows men to decrease their own
working time without losing status.
20In fact, on average, usual weekly hours worked by men on their main job decreased in the Netherlands from
38.1 hours in 1994 to 35.7 hours in 2011 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
stats.oecd.org) and also decreased during the same period for most other OECD countries.
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These results shed light on the motivations behind following behaviour in terms of working
time. A better understanding of such motivations can be important for the design of incentives.
For instance, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2013) examine the implications for taxation of
taking into account not only the role played by relative consumption, but also the implications of
conspicuous leisure, and conclude that while conspicuous consumption calls for progressive tax-
ation, conspicuous leisure would justify regressive taxation in some cases and not affect optimal
taxation in others. If individuals are motivated by conspicuous work rather than conspicuous
leisure, the case for progressive taxation becomes stronger.
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Appendix A - Figures
Figure A1: Histograms of the Variables of Interest
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Figure A2: Scatterplot of Peer Hours against Own Hours
30
Appendix B - Data
Data cleaning
The data contained a number of implausibly high values for both own and peer weekly working
time. We excluded observations with more than 72 weekly hours. This corresponds to dropping
the top percentile of the distribution of own hours in our sample. We tried different upper limits
for the hours variables, ranging from 60 hours to no limit. The choice of the upper limit had
only very little influence on the main estimation results. The instances in which the thresholds
influenced the results are mentioned in the results section (Section 4).
The CentER panel measures income in a very detailed way at the individual level, through a
number of questions on sources of income, such as earnings, social benefits, and transfers from
family. The total net household income is measured as the sum of the net incomes of the different
members of a household. The data are organized to avoid double-counting in case different
members of the same household mention the same income source. To eliminate implausibly low
and implausibly high values of household income, we exclude the top and bottom 0.5% of the
household income distribution. As for the hours, the choice of the threshold for cleaning the
household income variable had very little impact on the estimation results.
Prediction of missing values for peer income
Table B1 presents the estimation results of the model used to predict peer income where it was
missing. Admittedly, the coefficients estimated in this model can be influenced by selection bias
if answering the peer income question is related to the level of peer income. To check for this
possibility, we also estimated a simple linear model by ordinary least squares (OLS), with and
without correction for selection (results available from the authors). As an instrument for selec-
tion, we used the lag of the number of missing answers to peer-related questions other than the
question about peer income. (We could not use the present value since it was a perfect predictor
of being part of the estimation sample.) There was very little variation in this variable, but it still
had a negative and significant effect on the probability of answering the peer income question.
We did find evidence that selection matters. However, in our equations of interest, whether we
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Table B1: Peer Income: Ordered Logit Model
Peer age 0.5974***
(0.0831)
Peer age^2 -0.0190***
(0.0062)
Peer household size 0.2109***
(0.0227)
Most peers self-employed -0.1205
(0.0836)
Peer education level 0.5754***
(0.0166)
Male peers’ weekly working time 0.0347***
(0.0039)
Female peers’ weekly working time 0.0012
(0.0012)
Observations 7326
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Year dummies included as ad-
ditional controls.
used predicted peer income computed on the basis of the ordered logit, the simple OLS, or the
Heckman model with the selection equation made very little difference to the estimation results.
We therefore chose to use the linear prediction from the ordered logit because the distribution
of the predicted peer income variable was most similar to that of the measured one.
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Appendix C - Additional Tables
Table C1: Correlations between Own and Peer characteristics
Own / Peer Characteristics Age Household Size Education Level Weekly Hours Self-employed
Age 0.8169
Household Size 0.5207
Education Level 0.6078
Weekly Hours 0.2832
Self-employed 0.2037
Table C2: Cross-tables of Own and Peer Characteristics
Panel A - Cross-table of Age Groups
Own / Peer Age < 25 25-34 35-44 45-54 >= 55 Total
< 25 53 8 1 0 0 62
25-34 93 1,259 87 8 3 1,450
35-44 24 699 1,817 65 6 2,611
45-54 18 105 1,213 1,499 46 2,881
>= 55 9 19 136 763 272 1,199
Total 197 2,090 3,254 2,335 327 8,203
Panel B - Cross-Table of Education Level
Own / Peer Level Low Middle High Total
Low 916 865 99 1,880
Middle 403 1,686 493 2,582
High 111 930 2,359 3,400
Total 1,430 3,481 2,951 7,862
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Table C3: Weekly Hours Worked: OLS Model with Fixed-Effects Including Lags and Peer
Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.1095*** 0.0857***
(0.0391) (0.0289)
Lag of own weekly hours 0.0882***
(0.0290)
Lag of peer hours 0.0611**
(0.0276)
Peer age -0.0285
(0.0825)
Peer household size -0.0499
(0.1210)
Peer education level 0.1571
(0.1928)
Most peers self-employed 1.0979***
(0.3725)
Log net peer household income 1.4528** 1.8320** 0.6901
(0.7255) (0.7632) (0.6109)
Age 0.9785*** 1.0839*** 0.8594***
(0.2973) (0.3676) (0.2720)
Age^2 -0.0122*** -0.0137*** -0.0110***
(0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0029)
Number of children -0.3568 -0.4338 -0.0807
(0.2770) (0.3202) (0.2597)
Partner -0.0483 -0.5024 0.4209
(0.7482) (0.6006) (0.7810)
Constant 12.6744* 16.3611* 20.7639***
(7.5035) (9.1062) (6.3027)
Observations 5,692 5,005 8,203
Individuals 2,082 1,840 3,042
R2 0.05 0.04 0.03
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in parentheses; * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Year dummies included as additional controls.
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Table C4: Weekly Hours Worked: Pooled OLS Model
(1)
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.4158***
(0.0184)
Log net peer household income 1.4661***
(0.4625)
Age 0.6462***
(0.1049)
Age^2 -0.0083***
(0.0012)
Number of children 0.0820
(0.0931)
Partner 0.4964*
(0.2833)
Constant 9.8510***
(2.3787)
Observations 8203
R2 0.11
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Year dummies included as
additional controls.
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Table C5: Desired Working Time: OLS Model with Fixed-Effects
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.0677*
(0.0363)
Log net peer household income 0.3271
(0.8677)
Age 0.7113**
(0.3307)
Age^2 -0.0109***
(0.0036)
Number of children -0.7424
(0.4942)
Partner 0.5076
(0.9786)
Constant 23.2999***
(7.4174)
Observations 8203
Individuals 3042
R2 0.02
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in
parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01;
Year dummies included as additional controls.
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Table C6: Happiness: Ordered Logit Models with Fixed-Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BUC BUC FCF FCF
Weekly working time 0.0583** 0.0628** 0.0519* 0.0506*
(0.0269) (0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0291)
Weekly working time^2 -0.0006* -0.0006* -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Male peers’ weekly working time -0.0228** -0.0255***
(0.0100) (0.0096)
Log net peer household income -0.1858 -0.2938
(0.2302) (0.2272)
Log net household income 0.1558* 0.1725** 0.1402 0.1501*
(0.0865) (0.0863) (0.0870) (0.0875)
Looking for another job -0.3604*** -0.3598*** -0.3809*** -0.3980***
(0.1211) (0.1214) (0.1135) (0.1140)
Subjective health 0.4760*** 0.4853*** 0.4937*** 0.5073***
(0.0924) (0.0926) (0.0933) (0.0937)
Age -0.2281* -0.2214* -0.2320** -0.2145**
(0.1180) (0.1185) (0.0933) (0.0939)
Age^2 0.0029** 0.0028** 0.0030*** 0.0028***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Number of children -0.0210 -0.0313 0.0024 0.0070
(0.1323) (0.1324) (0.1086) (0.1091)
Partner 1.5152*** 1.5237*** 1.5210*** 1.5353***
(0.4133) (0.4122) (0.2947) (0.2952)
Observations 4252 4252 3722 3722
Individuals 777 777 777 777
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Year dummies included
as additional controls.
37
Table C7: Happiness: OLS Model with Fixed-Effects Including Hours Difference in a Non-Linear
Way
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weekly hours 0.0151** 0.0023 0.0071 0.0046
(0.0076) (0.0066) (0.0044) (0.0038)
Weekly hours^2 -0.0002** -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Difference in hours 0.0034 0.0023
(0.0021) (0.0018)
Difference in hours^2 0.0001** -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Working less hours than peers -0.0492** -0.0575**
(0.0239) (0.0234)
Working more hours than peers -0.0048 -0.0037
(0.0187) (0.0188)
Log net household income 0.0255* 0.0233 0.0269* 0.0237*
(0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0144)
Log net peer household income -0.0184 0.0488 -0.0641 0.0510
(0.0455) (0.0472) (0.0442) (0.0473)
Looking for another job -0.0530*** -0.0535*** -0.0519*** -0.0526***
(0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0198)
Subjective health 0.0823*** 0.0832*** 0.0823*** 0.0833***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Age -0.0343* -0.0362* -0.0329 -0.0364*
(0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0205)
Age^2 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Number of children -0.0031 0.0023 -0.0032 0.0031
(0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0208)
Partner 0.3191*** 0.3104*** 0.3214*** 0.3127***
(0.0864) (0.0865) (0.0862) (0.0864)
Constant 3.6247*** 3.7974*** 3.7623*** 3.7339***
(0.5317) (0.5071) (0.5015) (0.4899)
Observations 8,203 8,149 8,203 8,149
Individuals 3,042 3,026 3,042 3,026
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01; Year dummies included as additional controls.
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Table C8: Happiness: OLS Model with Fixed-Effects, Controlling for Exogenous Effects
Weekly hours 0.0095**
(0.0042)
Weekly hours^2 -0.0001*
(0.0000)
Male peers’ weekly hours -0.0041**
(0.0020)
Peer age -0.0021
(0.0091)
Peer household size -0.0028
(0.0099)
Peer education level 0.0256
(0.0158)
Most peers self-employed -0.0090
(0.0344)
Log net household income 0.0269*
(0.0147)
Log net peer household income -0.0508
(0.0446)
Looking for another job -0.0530***
(0.0197)
Subjective health 0.0818***
(0.0154)
Age -0.0318
(0.0205)
Age^2 0.0004*
(0.0002)
Number of children -0.0028
(0.0206)
Partner 0.3192***
(0.0862)
Constant 3.7742***
(0.5123)
Observations 8,203
Individuals 3,042
R2 0.04
Standard errors (clustered by individual) in
parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01;
Year dummies included as additional controls.
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Table C9: Happiness: Pooled OLS Models
(1) (2)
Weekly hours 0.0060** 0.0061**
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Weekly hours^2 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Male peers’ weekly hours 0.0006
(0.0013)
Log net household income 0.0309*** 0.0324***
(0.0110) (0.0113)
Log net peer household income -0.0192
(0.0316)
Looking for another job -0.0860*** -0.0859***
(0.0164) (0.0164)
Subjective health 0.2721*** 0.2722***
(0.0102) (0.0102)
Age -0.0111 -0.0106
(0.0070) (0.0071)
Age^2 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Number of children -0.0231*** -0.0232***
(0.0062) (0.0062)
Partner 0.4162*** 0.4173***
(0.0189) (0.0190)
Constant 2.4249*** 2.4120***
(0.1851) (0.1901)
Observations 8203 8203
R2 0.16 0.16
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***
p<0.01; Year dummies included as additional controls.
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